The topic of
discussion for this Constitution Monday comes from Article III, Section 1,
Clause 1: “The Judges … shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.”
Known as the “Judicial Compensation Clause,” this provision assures the
judges that they will receive compensation for their services and that their
compensation will not be decreased if their decisions dissatisfy the administration
in power. This provision gives the
judges the freedom to make the right decision without worrying about their
compensation or tenure.
“One of the most severe
handicaps to the dispensing of evenhanded justice, from a judicial point of
view, was the English custom of reducing the salaries of judges who displeased
the king or his officers. This provision
was designed to prevent this from happening in the United States.” (See W. Cleon Skousen in The Making of America – The Substance and Meaning of the Constitution, p.
591.)
“The Judicial Compensation
Clause of Article III, Section 1, Clause 1, would appear to be the dream of a
textualist interpretation. The clause
clearly and unambiguously states that the compensation of federal judges cannot
be diminished during their service. Yet
this clause has produced some of the most direct confrontations between the
judicial and legislative branches.
“The Judicial Compensation
Clause is literally and conceptually tied to the Good Behavior Clause. (See Article III, Section 1.) The guarantee of life tenure would only
afford judges independence if they could not be made dependent through their
salaries and benefits. This was an issue
of particular interest to the Framers because the compensation of colonial
judges had been a heated point of contention with the Crown….
“Given the clarity of the
language on any direct diminishment of judicial salaries, most of the
controversy under this clause concerns forms of indirect or collateral
diminishment…. [There have been problems with COLAs, etc. as recently as 2001
and 2002.]
“There is no question that the
Framers were concerned about collateral reductions. Although not known as COLAs in the 1700s, the
concept of inflation adjustment was not unfamiliar to the Framers. For example, Alexander Hamilton specifically
addressed the effect of `fluctuations in the value of money’ on judicial
salaries. However, in the language of
the Constitution such adjustments were to be left to the discretion of Congress.” (See Jonathan Turley in The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, pp. 238-239.)
No comments:
Post a Comment